Florida Law Review
Volume 3

Issue 3

Article 14

October 1950

Municipal Zoning: Florida Law and Practice
Frank H. Elmore Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Frank H. Elmore Jr., Municipal Zoning: Florida Law and Practice, 3 Fla. L. Rev. 395 (1950).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol3/iss3/14

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Florida Law Review by an authorized editor of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For more
information, please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu.

Elmore: Municipal Zoning: Florida Law and Practice

DATE DOWNLOADED: Fri Aug 19 12:25:55 2022
SOURCE: Content Downloaded from HeinOnline
Citations:
Bluebook 21st ed.
3 U. FLA. L. REV. 395 (1950).
ALWD 7th ed.
, , 3 U. Fla. L. Rev. 395 (1950).
APA 7th ed.
(1950). University of Florida Law Review, 3(3), 395-403.
Chicago 17th ed.
"," University of Florida Law Review 3, no. 3 (Fall 1950): 395-403
AGLC 4th ed.
'' (1950) 3(3) University of Florida Law Review 395
OSCOLA 4th ed.
'' (1950) 3 U Fla L Rev 395
Provided by:
University of Florida / Lawton Chiles Legal Information Center
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance of HeinOnline's Terms and
Conditions of the license agreement available at
https://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope of your license, please use:
Copyright Information

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1950

1

Florida Law Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 3 [1950], Art. 14
BOOK REVIEWS

will permit recovery whenever an unexpected injury, happening suddenly, is on the facts of record traced to the employment.
ROBERT

H. WniiS

BOOK REVIEWS
By Ernest R. Bartley
and William W. Boyer, Jr. Gainesville: Public Administration
Clearing Service of the University of Florida. 1950. Pp. 90. $1.00.

MuNicI'AL ZONING: FLo=IA LAw AND PRACriCE.

This is a careful statement of the Florida law as to zoning of real
property in cities. Except for a few incidental references, zoning in
counties is expressly omitted. The book will be useful to city attorneys
and other lawyers and to some laymen, particularly city officials and
real estate groups. It is also a handy guide on the subject of zoning
for the general citizen. The authors base their study on careful consideration of Florida cases that have reached the Supreme Court,
sixty-seven of these being cited in proper legal form. In addition, forty
of the leading federal cases on zoning, and sixty-two from other state
jurisdictions, are considered in their relation to Florida statute law
or to Florida cases. The Florida decisions are thus considered in perspective with those of these other jurisdictions.
It should be noted that this is not a work on how to zone from a
city planning standpoint. That subject is mentioned briefly, and appropriate standard works on the subject are referred to in the footnotes
to the first chapter. The distinction is also maae between "spot zoning,"
comprehensive zoning, and planning. Basically, any zoning not based
on planning will be unsatisfactory because it fails to take into account
any study as to further growth of the community. Spot zoning is a
device that was used in the early days of zoning, when only parts of
sections of a community were zoned. This device is subject to the
objection that such a piecemeal approach never provides satisfactory
long-range results.
Dr. Bartley and Mr. Boyer show that the legal power to zone is
based on enabling legislation by the state legislature. But even when
so authorized, early zoning legislation in the United States, from 1900
to 1925, was frequently ineffective, because there was no clear prece-
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dent until the Euclid case 1 was decided by the United States Supreme
Court. It is thus only within the past twenty-five years that, through
the police power, the courts have recognized the presumptive validity
of zoning ordinances. Following this decision, municipal authorities
had some assurance that zoning regulations could be enforced.
No substantial departure is found in Florida from this national
pattern. Early Florida cases denied any inherent power of a municipal
corporation to zone; such power had to be given expressly by special
legislative act. The Florida real estate boom of 1925 brought with it
a large amount of planning at the city level and the adoption of city
zoning ordinances of a comprehensive nature. With the collapse of
the boom, much of this early work lapsed. Then, after the establishment of state planning boards and with federal aid to localities in
1935, there was a renewal of interest on the part of local communities.
It is rather surprising to find, however, that all of the early authority
for cities to zone was granted by special legislation. It was not until
1939 that a general state enabling act was enacted by the Legislature
and Florida became the forty-eighth state to adopt such general provisions. From this date special legislation has no longer been the only
source of city authority to zone.
There is considerable material in this work by Dr. Bartley and Mr.
Boyer on the legal aspects of the procedure of zoning. Chapter 3,
which deals with this problem and is of exceptional practical value,
includes consideration of the function of planning boards, the city
commission or other city legislative bodies, rules of procedure for city
boards of adjustment, and judicial review of board of adjustment acts.
Both the validity of zoning regulations and the proper procedure in
their adoption are also covered.
The fourth chapter discusses the doctrine of presumptive validity
as it affects zoning ordinances. The rulings in cases both from the
nation at large and in Florida are considered. This section closes with
a treatment of the limitations on the doctrine of presumptive validity
and the employment of injunction and mandamus in acts affecting
zoning.
In considering problems of Florida municipal zoning the authors
have an interesting review of the recent cases in Florida in which
aesthetics are considered as a valid legal basis for zoning. In a few
state jurisdictions this basis is now recognized. The Florida Supreme
'Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365 (1926).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1950

3

Florida Law Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 3 [1950], Art. 14
BOOK REVIEWS

Court, however, in the recent case of Miami Beach v. First Trust
Company,2 at first recognized the validity of zoning based on
aesthetics, but on rehearing 3 denied it. One prior decision, however,
does seem to take into account the validity of zoning based on
aesthetics, if the loss to the property owner be not too great. Thus
the Florida doctrine in this field remains in doubt at the present
writing.
One word more should be said as to the limitations of this work.
It is especially useful in this jurisdiction because it considers many
of our Florida cases more fully than do the textbooks on the law of
zoning or the legal encyclopedias such as Corpus Juris Secundum. On
the other hand, a number of secondary issues not yet adjudicated in
Florida are omitted; accordingly, when a lawyer has a case of first
impression here, he may find a case from another jurisdiction in one
of these other works. It should also be noted that the law on issuance
of building certificates is not covered.
The book is well organized and clearly written, and the material
is presented with thoroughness. Indeed, in some instances certain
legal issues are considered at such length that the lay reader may
wish to skip part of the argument. But an important service has been
rendered in drawing together in one place the material on zoning at
the city level as adjudicated in Florida.
MANNING

J.

DAUER

Professor of Political Science,
University of Florida

CoURs oN TmRL4. By Jerome Frank. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press. Pp. x, 429, and index. $5.00.
Judge Frank, in a brilliant style that is familiar to readers of his
earlier books, Law and the Modern Mind (1930), and If Men Were
Angels (1942), describes Courts on Trial as a study of "myth and
reality in American justice." It is intended, he says, "for intelligent
non-lawyers as well as lawyers." The emphasis throughout the book
is upon "court-house government," its importance, mystery and weaknesses. A decision of a trial court, he states, is generally regarded as
245 So.2d 681 (Fla. 1949).
845 So.2d 687 (Fla. 1950).
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the result of applying legal rules to established facts. In a dynamic
society, with rapidly changing economic and political conditions, and
with an increasing multiplicity of rules, there is bound to be increasing
uncertainty as to the rule that a court will apply in a particular case.
The assumption of Langdell that a rule exists for every case, and that
the duty of the court is simply to find it on the shelves of a well
stocked library, and to apply it to the facts at hand, is pure myth.
A determination of the "actual, objective facts," Judge Frank contends, is a far more difficult problem than arriving at the applicable
rules of law. Faulty recollection, interest, bias, ignorance or death of a
witness, varying abilities of counsel, incompetent jurors and unqualified
judges are factors that contribute to the almost utter lack of predictability of the "'facts" upon which a case will be decided. An
appellate court will rarely disturb the findings of a judge or the verdict
of a juror on questions of fact; hence, the role of the trial court is of
far greater importance to the litigant than that of the appellate court.
With puckish delight, and with the elan of a discoverer, Judge Frank
punctures many a legal myth which has not been seriously accepted by
the legal profession since Bentham wrote on Blackstone. He also makes
numerous references, many of them esoteric, to the fields of anthropology, history, psychology, and music. Suggested reforms, some of
them novel, are found in almost every chapter.
it is regrettable that Judge Frank does not give greater attention
to the solid work of the American Bar Association, and of local bar
associations, and their efforts to improve legal and judicial practices.
For example, Arthur T. Vanderbilt's Minimum Standards of Judicial
Administration and The Improvement of the Administration of
Justice, a handbook prepared by the Section of Judicial Administration
of the American Bar Association, to which no references are made,
suggest the solutions to many of the problems discussed by the author.
While the book is expertly written, it is submitted that it will not
give to the intelligent non-lawyer an altogether fair picture of the legal
and judicial practices in the United States today.
A. McR,
JR.
Member of Bartow, Florida, Bar
WILLIAM
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FuLim, Chief Justice of the United States, 18881910. By Willard L. King. New York: The Macmillan Company.
1950. Pp. x, 387. $5.00.

MELLvLE WESTON

Mr. King has written a useful book about his fellow Chicagoan
Melville Fuller, Chief Justice between Waite and White. Most lawyers
probably know less about this period of the Supreme Court of the
United States than any other, due partly to the relatively few crucial
cases decided and partly to the absence of genius from the Court.
There was nothing like "the power to tax is the power to destroy" of
Marshall. The basic constitutional questions had been settled by Marshall's Court or, at least, the basic policy had been determined. The
Court under Chase and Waite had already placed a narrow construction on the Civil War amendments, particularly the Fourteenth, giving
a maximum of latitude to the states, to the chagrin of the radical
Republicans.
During Fuller's long tenure there was comparatively little public
indignation at the Court's actions, although the Court was accused of
favoring the vested interests in the Sugar Trust,' Debs,2 and Income
Tax3 cases, all decided in 1895. At least there was nothing like the
uproar caused by the Dred Scott case 4 or by the Court-packing of
President Grant in an attempt to obtain a reversal of the first legal
tender case.5 Perhaps the Chief Justice was partly responsible for the
relative present obscurity of his Court. Despite the frequency of
dissents, the Chief Justice was usually able to keep dissenting opinions
temperate and prevent violent differences among the justices from
making newspaper copy. Justices Miller and Holmes, who between
them served under Taney, Chase, Waite, Fuller, White, Taft, and
Hughes, a period of nearly eighty years, both said Fuller was the
greatest presiding officer they had ever known. This kind of ability,
however valuable, cannot compete with that of a Holmes in the
struggle for legal immortality. "The 14th Amendment does not enact
Herbert Spencer's Social Statics" is remembered long after administrative capacity is forgotten.
The twenty-two years of Fuller's service on the Court are by no
'United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
"In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895).
Pollock v. Farmer's Loan and Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895).
4
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393 (U.S. 1857).
:'-Hepburn v. Griswold, 8 Wall. 603 (U.S. 1869).
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means unimportant. The power of the Federal Government to regulate
commerce was extended; suits between states were numerous; and
toward the end of the period the Court began dealing with the social
legislation of states. Justice Brewer said paternalism was odious to
him, and what is odious to a judge is apt to be unconstitutional, as is
illustrated by the Court's decision in Lochner v. New York, 6 holding
invalid a state law limiting to ten the hours of daily work in bakeries.
Chief Justice Fuller's most famous opinion is in Pollock v. Farmers
Loan and Trust Co.," holding a federal income tax to be a direct tax.
Although Mr. King stoutly defends the opinion against contemporary
criticism, he is objective enough to print the enlightening statistic
showing that the five anti-tax judges were from wealthy states while
the four pro-tax judges were from poor states.
The Insular cases 8 presented the difficult problem of determining
the status of the new territory acquired as a result of the Spanish War.
The majority of the Court, intensely nationalistic, refused to hold that
"the Constitution follows the flag," to use the expression of William
Jennings Bryan. In view of the present struggle of conflicting ideologies, one may speculate on our moral loss in failing to adopt Fuller's
views, as expressed in his dissent in the Downes case: 9
"That theory [the Court's] assumes that the Constitution
created a government empowered to acquire countries throughout the world, to be governed by different rules than those obtaining in the original States and territories, and substitutes for
the present system of republican government, a system of domination over distant provinces in the exercise of unrestricted
power.
Mr. King has written in the main about Fuller and only incidentally
about the Court. The book begins with Fuller's birth in Maine during
6198 U.S. 45 (1905).
7
See note 3 supra.
8
Porto Rico v. Tapia, 245 U.S. 639 (1918); Trono v. United States, 199 U.S.
521 (1905); Rasmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516 (1905); Dorr v. United
States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904); Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100 (1904);
Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903); The Diamond Rings, 183 U.S. 176
(1901); Dooley v. United States, 183 U.S. 151 (1901); Downes v. Bidwell, 182
U.S. 244 (1901); Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222 (1901); DeLima v.
Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901); Neeley v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109 (1901).
9
Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 373 (1901).
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Jackson's administration, and quite a few of his ancestors are thrown
in for good measure. The author must have done a prodigious amount
of digging for Fuller material. The most interesting of the incidents
related by Mr. King, however, concern the members of Fullers Court.
To one toughened by years of reading briefs and appellate opinions,
Mr. King's style seems almost sprightly at times. The best example of
this is the sex-and-blood-spiced story of the feud between Judge Terry
and Justice Fields, who had been together on the California Supreme
Court. Terry attacked Fields in a California railroad station. Neagle,
a marshal assigned to protect Fields, shot and killed Terry. Naturally
Mr. King includes details omitted by Justice Harlan in his opinion in
the Terry contempt case' 0 and by Justice Miller in his later opinion
in the Neagle habeas corpus case.-"
Mr. King makes one fairly well acquainted with Chief Justice
Fuller's fellow judges. Samuel Miller, the empiricist from Iowa, was
the philosophical as well as political opposite of the dogmatic Fields.
These two were the survivors of the Court from Lincoln's day. For
those who haven't heard it before, the story of the efforts of the
brethren to get Fields to retire after senility set in is quite interesting.
With some exaggeration, Mr. King calls Bradley of New Jersey the
Holmes of the early Fuller Court. Blatchford of New York was the
work horse who rarely dissented. Justice Harlan, the former Union
colonel from Kentucky, is best described by Holmes, who told Sir
Frederick Pollock that Harlan's mind was a powerful vise, the jaws
of which couldn't be got within two inches of each other. The scholar
of the Court was Horace Gray of Massachusetts, whom Holmes succeeded. Gray's brother, John Chipman, is familiar as the author of
the standard work The Rule Against Perpetuities.Mr. King makes the
Fuller period seem quite recent by anecdotes concerning Samuel
Williston, who was Justice Grays secretary in 1888.
Chief Justice Fuller was no scholar but he was an intellectual. His
judicial work was competent but not exceptional. Apparently he knew
how to win friends and influence people, brilliant people like Bradley
and Holmes as well as considerably less brilliant ones like McKenna.
Without surrendering any of their intellectual independence, his
brother judges desired Justice Fullers approbation. One gets no
flashes of new insight into either people or events from Mr. King's
10Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289 (1888).
111n re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1890). The Court held that Neagle could not be
tried for murder by the California court.
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book; one does get to know better some men well worth knowing, and
is apt to acquire a high regard and personal affection for Chief
Justice Fuller.
STANLEY MILLEDGE

Circuit Judge,
Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida

SUPREME COURT PRACTiCE.

By Robert L. Stern and Eugene Greszman.

Washington: The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc. 1950. Pp. xiii,
553, table of cases and index. $7.50.
This is the first work devoted to describing in detail the practice
and procedure in the Supreme Court of the United States to appear in
over twenty years. As such it fills a genuine need, for in recent times
the governing statutes, the Court's own rules, and the unwritten
practices have been materially altered.
In this book the authors take you by the hand and conduct you on
a detailed tour of the Olympian operations which are carried on and
housed in the magnificent, gleaming, white marble palace in Washington where sits the Supreme Court of the United States. They bring,
as it were, the Supreme Court to you, which is no mean accomplishment, for the Court, like Mahomet's mountain, requires us to come to
it. Most lawyers may never have occasion to invoke the Supreme
Court's jurisdiction; if they do, without benefit of previous experience
or of skilled collaboration, the whole process usually appears to them
to be somewhat mysterious and terrifying. With Supreme Court Practice as a guide, the mystery is dispelled and the terror abated. Awe
remains, as it should in relations with this august tribunal. (No one
should aspire to familiarity with the Supreme Court; not only is it in
vain but a school child may tell what it breeds).
"The object of this book is to tell lawyers what they will need to
know in order to handle a case in the United States Supreme Court"
(p. 1). It achieves this objective well. It is not, nor is it intended to be,
exhaustive in its treatment of Supreme Court jurisdiction and procedure; but its considerable detail and practical approach will probably prove adequate for most purposes. And, as the authors say, "If a
difficult problem arises, the authorities cited will serve as leads to
further research" (p. 1).
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The chapter on the exercise of certiorari jurisdiction alone should
insure the value of this volume to the busy general practitioner. It is
perhaps too much to hope that its use might also serve to temper the
zeal of the "eager beaver" of the bar who leaps to invoke the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court on behalf of his client in cases in which
the state court has passed upon the assertion of a right, title, privilege,
or immunity under federal law, without due regard to the lack of
novelty or importance of the principles involved. Cases of this kind
are concerned primarily with the construction and application of the
commerce clause, the full faith and credit clause, and the Fourteenth
Amendment; and the authors tell us that these cases constitute by
far the most frequently exercised segment of the Supreme Court's
appellate jurisdiction. Some lawyers appear to proceed on the theory
that litigants are automatically entitled to review by the Supreme
Court of the decisions of state courts of last resort in cases dealing
with these portions of the Federal Constitution.
"It is important for the bar to be familiar with the factors
which are treated by the Court as appropriate grounds for the
granting of petitions for writs of certiorari. These factors apparently are not fully appreciated, for year in and year out about
80-85% of the petitions for certiorari are denied" (p. 97).
As Chief Justice Vinson noted in 1949 (quoted on p. 98):
"The debates in the Constitutional Convention make clear that
the purpose of the establishment of one supreme national tribunal
was, in the words of John Rutledge of South Carolina, 'to secure
the national rights and uniformity of Judgmts [sic].' The function of the Supreme Court is, therefore, to resolve conflicts of
opinion on federal questions that have arisen among lower courts,
to pass upon questions of wide import under the Constitution,
laws, and treaties of the United States, and to exercise supervisory power over lower federal courts.... Those of you whose
petitions for certiorari are granted by the Supreme Court will
know, therefore, that you are, in a sense, prosecuting or defending class actions; that you represent not only your clients,
but tremendously important principles, upon which are based
the plans, hopes, and aspirations of a great many people
throughout the country."
There is a good and detailed table of contents, which is itself an
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outline of the subject-matter. The Rules of the Supreme Court with
index, pertinent federal statutes, Rules of Civil and Criminal Procedure, and Rules of the Court of Claims are included. The book also
contains a comprehensive collection of forms with index.
This reviewer was privileged to be associated with one of the
authors, Mr. Stern, for several years in the service of the United States
Department of Justice and holds him in high regard as a friend, a
scholar and a gentleman.
FRANK

H.

ELMORE, JR.

Member of Jacksonville, Florida,Bar
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